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Abstract—In this paper, we are concerned with the problem
of estimating the speed of an RF jammer that moves towards a
group/platoon of moving wireless communicating nodes. In our
system model, the group of nodes receives an information signal
from a master node, that they want to decode, while the Radio
Frequency (RF) jammer desires to disrupt this communication
as it approaches them. For this system model, we propose first
a transmission scheme where the master node remains silent for
a time period while it transmits in a subsequent slot. Second,
we develop a joint data and jamming estimation algorithm that
uses Linear Minimum Mean Square Error (LMMSE) estimation.
We develop analytical closed-form expressions that characterize
the Mean Square Error (MSE) of the data and jamming
signal estimates. Third, we propose a cooperative jammer speed
estimation algorithm based on the jamming signal estimates at
each node of the network. Our numerical and simulation results
for different system configurations prove the ability of our overall
system to estimate with high accuracy and the RF jamming
signals and the speed of the jammer.
Index Terms—Platoon of Vehicles; LMMSE; MSE; MAE; RF
Jamming attack; RF Jammer Speed;
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication has constraints in terms of power,
bandwidth, reliability, and communication range. As the utility
and usefulness of these networks increase every day, more and
more malicious competitors appear and target these networks
with different types of security attacks. Radio frequency (RF)
jamming is one method that a malicious node can use to
disrupt the transmission between the nodes of a wireless
network [1], [2]. In this type of attack a signal is used to disrupt
the communication via the broadcast medium, as most nodes
use one single frequency band. In certain application domains
where groups of wireless nodes must communicate reliably in
broadcast mode, like drone swarms or platoons of autonomous
vehicles [3] and applications for dynamic charging of electric
vehicles through inter-vehicle communication [4], [5], an RF
jammer can have a profound effect in the operation of the
system if it can disrupt wireless communication [6], [7]. There
are methods to defend against a jamming attack such as spread
spectrum communication or increase of transmission power,
but they typically incur a high cost (power, bandwidth, or com-
plexity). Another way to defend against an RF jamming attack
is for the whole group of nodes to move away from the jammer
in a flying ad hoc networks (FANETs) environment [8], [9] or
in a platoon that forms a wireless vehicular network [8]. But to
do so the group of nodes, especially in a platoon of vehicles,
must be able to estimate the behavior of the jammer [10], [11].
Of particular interest is its speed relative to the platoon since
it reveals whether the jammer is approaching or moving away.
The focus of this paper is to derive accurate estimates of the
speed of the jammer in a group of wireless moving nodes.
Contrary to seeing RF jamming interference as a problem of
an individual node, we propose to address it at the group level
since the applications of interest fall into this category. Our
first contribution is that we propose to use jointly the data
from wireless receivers in platoon nodes for the purpose of
estimating the jamming signal and eventually the speed of the
jammer. To achieve our goal we design a transmission protocol
for the platoon and an associated estimation algorithm. With
our protocol in the first time slot the master node does
not transmit any useful information so we obtain a clear
observation of just the jamming signal and the receiver noise,
while in the second time slot where the information signal
is transmitted we observe an additive form the information
signal, the jamming signal, and the noise. Under this protocol,
we use the Linear Minimum Mean Square Error Estimator
(LMMSE) to estimate both the information signal u and the
jamming signal zi for every node i in the platoon. Our main
result is a closed-form expression of the Mean Square Error
(MSE) of the signal u and the jamming signal zi. The second
contribution is a new algorithm that combines the jamming
signal estimates received at the nodes of the platoon, so as to
achieve an accurate estimate of the jammer speed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section II
we present related work while in Section III we describe our
system model and the assumptions. In Sections IV, V, we
present the proposed joint data, jamming signal, and speed
estimation algorithms including all the analytical results. In
Sections VI, VII we present numerical and simulation results.
Finally in Section VIII we conclude this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Speed Estimation. Our literature survey indicates that ac-
tive vehicle safety systems have not benefited sufficiently from
the additional information received from a connected vehicle
network so as to design more reliable vehicle speed estimation
algorithms [12], [13], [14]. M. Pirani et al [15] introduce
distributed algorithms for speed estimation where each vehicle
can gather information from other vehicles in the network
to be used for speed fault detection and reconstruction. This
procedure is used as a bank of information for a single vehicle
to diagnose and correct a possible fault in its own speed
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2estimation/measurements. The same approach is also consid-
ered in [16] for a platoon of connected vehicles equipped
with Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC). Without
using a distributed system, the authors in [11] proposed a
method for speed estimation between one transmitter and one
receiver. However, none of these approaches take into account
the possible RF jamming in the area and are not concerned
with the speed of the jammer. In contrast, there is considerable
work regarding distributed jamming attack detection, but only
a few methods exploit distributed jamming signal estimation.
Jamming Detection. Several works cover the problem of
distributed jamming detection (but not estimation) in Multiple-
Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems. The majority of these
works proposed jamming detection methods with a Gen-
eralized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) in MIMO systems
[17], [18]. The authors in [19] in order to secure the legitimate
communication, proposed a jamming detection method in
non-coherent Single-Input-Multiple-Output (SIMO) systems,
in which channel statistics are not required. It was shown that
the probability of detection initially grows with the number
of receive antennas but converges quickly, while the channel
statistics from the jammer to the receiver always influence
the performance. All of these works use additional hardware
(e.g. more antennas) on the transmitter and receiver to detect a
jamming attack. More recent works like [7] proposed methods
for jamming detection in Vehicular Networks (VANETs) with
Machine Learning (ML) methods like clustering. The authors
proposed new algorithms that can differentiate intentional from
unintentional jamming as well as extract specific features of
the RF jamming signal. In contrast, our proposed method
desires to exploit the distributed environment of multiple
receivers to effectively estimate the jamming signal and the
jammer speed.
Jamming Estimation. Distributed estimation (DES) is a
topic that has been investigated considerably in the literature.
However, to the best of our knowledge no works have con-
sidered using DES in a setting where a jamming signal and
the jammer speed need to be simultaneously estimated. The
most closely related work where DES is used for jamming
estimation can be found in [20] where the authors implemented
a joint Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC) decoder
and LMMSE estimator for an interfering (jamming) signal.
Similarly, the authors in [21] investigate the problem of
distributed decoding under a white noise jamming attack.
However, the aforementioned methods have as prime goal the
correct decoding of the valuable data sent by the transmitter
under an interference source.
Our Work. In contrast to all the aforementioned works, this
paper proposes a two-stage transmission scheme in which the
master node remains silent for one slot out of the two time
slots. This method is superior in estimating jointly the data
and jamming signal using an LMMSE estimation compared
to a baseline system. Subsequently, using this jamming signal
estimate, the speed of the jammer is also estimated. All the
above are accomplished without any extra hardware such as
multiple antennas on the transmitter and the receiver.
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Fig. 1. Wireless communication network for DES of the speed of the jammer.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Topology: We consider a wireless Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
communication network that consists of a set of N nodes. The
first node is the master node who sends the same information
messages to the other nodes. Also there is a Jammer (J) who
uses his jamming signals to thwart the communication between
the master node and the other nodes of the network. In our
topology the N−1 receivers move as a platoon of vehicles with
approximately the same speed (ur,1 ' ur,2 ' ... ' ur,N−1 =
ur), using the CACC technology [22] and with a constant
distance (d) between the members of the platoon (fixed to 5m
in our experiments). Also there is a jammer who moves on a
parallel road in relation to the platoon with speed uj and when
approaching the platoon within a relatively short distance on
the x-axis (at about xdist) starts its jamming attack. Observing
the topology of the investigated scenario, N − 1 orthogonal
triangles are formed between the jammer, the specific receiver
and the vertical projection (ydist) of the position of the jammer
on the road that the platoon is located. So, for every vertical
triangle the Angle of Departure (AOD) values between the
jammer and each one from the receivers can be defined using
the geometry of the proposed topology as:
(1) : cosφ1 =
xdist
dist1
(2) : cosφ2 =
xdist + d
dist1
(3) : cosφ3 =
xdist + 2 ∗ d
dist2
...
(N − 1) : cosφN−1 = xdist + (N − 2) ∗ d
distN−1
(1)
where disti is the actual distance between the jammer and the
i-th receiver.
Observation Model: Each node i during slot t observes
yi,t as illustrated in Fig. 1. In the first time slot, when the
master node does not transmit anything, each node observers
3only the jamming signal zi. In the second time slot when
the master node transmits a signal u, each node receives two
interfering signals: one from the master node, u through a
channel hi, and the aggregate signal zi from the jammer
(which is the result of what the jammer transmitted through
an unknown channel hj,i) that takes into account the relative
speed between jammer-receiver and AOD of the transmitted
jamming signal. The noise wi,t for each time slot is Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance
σ2w and is uncorrelated across the nodes. So in two different
time slots we have two observations in every node:
yi,t = zi + wi,t (master node does not transmit) (2)
yi,t = hi ∗ u+ zi + wi,t (master node transmits) (3)
In the above i indicates the node and t indicates the time
slot. Hence, the observations form the random vector ~y =
[y1,1 y1,2 y2,1 y2,2 ... yN−1,1 yN−1,2]T that has 2(N − 1)
elements. We now define the vectors
~u = [z1 z2 z3 z4 ... zN−1 u]T
which is a N × 1 vector and
~w = [w1,1 w1,2 w2,1 w2,2 ... wN−1,1 wN−1,2]T
which is also a 2(N − 1)× 1. The final signal model for our
system becomes:
~y = H~u+ ~w (4)
where H is the following matrix:
1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 0 . . . h1
0 1 0 . . . 0
0 1 0 . . . h2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1 0
0 0 . . . 1 hN−1

A. Considered Channel Models
We progressively investigate our idea in the context of more
complex channel models and we describe them next.
Rayleigh Channel: For the wireless link we assume flat
Rayleigh fading, while the channel remains the same for two
consecutive time slots (quasi-static). Hence for every time
slot during the transmission of a packet we have |hi| ∼
Ray(E[|hi|2]) [23]. The average received power is E[|hi|2] =
1/distpa where dist is the node’s distance from the master
node and pa is the path loss exponent set to 3. We assume
that the channel between the master node and the remaining
ones is known since it can be easily calculated from packet
preambles.
V2V Stochastic Channel: With this more advanced model,
the received signal at the i ∈ [1, ..., N −1] receiver nodes that
is received from the jammer through a stochastic wireless V2V
channel using the proposed two-slot transmission protocol can
be modeled as follows [11]:
yi,1 = γipoj,ie
j 2piλ fD,iτi ∗ zi + wi,1 (5)
yi,2 = γipoM,ie
j 2piλ fDM,iτi,M ∗u+γipoj,iej 2piλ fD,iτi ∗zi+wi,2
(6)
All the wireless links between the jammer and the multiple
receivers and the links between the master node and the mul-
tiple receivers are assumed Line of Sight (LOS). However, the
proposed method can be easily applied in a multipath scenario
in which in addition to the specular LOS component there are
several other Non Line of Sight (NLOS) diffuse components
due to multipath reflections [11]. In the above equations, γi
is the amplitude associated with the LOS path, poM,i, poj,i
represents the corresponding free space propagation losses
from the master node and the jammer to the i-th receiver. The λ
is the wavelength. The complex coefficient γi is assumed to be
constant over the observation interval. The variables τi,M , τi
and fDM,i, fD,i represent the time delays and Doppler shifts of
the transmitted signal from the master node and the jammer,
respectively. Finally, ∆ui is the relative speed between the
jammer and the specific receiver and wi,1, wi,2 represents the
AWGN with zero mean. Note that (5) corresponds to the first
time slot in which only the jammer transmits its symbol (as
in (2)) and (6) corresponds to the second time slot in which
the master node transmits its signal and the jammer interferes
too (as in (3)). The channel model can be modeled exactly
as the relation (11) in [11]. Since we want to include the
relative speed between the jammer and the receiver in the last
equations (5), (6) we write the Doppler frequency fD,i from
the transmitted signal by the jammer as:
fD,i =
∆uifc cosφi
c
(7)
where fc the carrier frequency with value 5.9Ghz (which is
the band dedicated to V2V communication). Also cosφi is the
incidence AOD between the jammer and the i-th receiver and
c is the speed of light.
B. Jammer Behavior
We consider jammers that aim to block completely the
communication over a link by emitting interference reactively
when they detect packets over the air, thus causing a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack. The jammers minimize their activity to
only a few symbols per packet and use minimal, but sufficient
power, to remain undetected. We assume that the jammer is
pretty capable and is able to sniff any symbol of the over the
air transmissions in real-time and react with a jamming signal
that flips selected symbols at the receiver with high probability
(see [24]). This type of reactive jammer is designed to start
transmitting upon sensing energy above a certain threshold
in order for a reactive jamming attack to succeed. We set the
latter to −75 dBm as it is empirically determined to be a good
tradeoff between jammer sensitivity and false transmission
detection rate, when an ongoing 802.11p transmission is
assumed [25].
For the jamming signal we don’t have any information for
its variance. We assume that the reactive jammer transmits
after its being triggered for two consecutive time slots and
this has the result that the jamming signal is the same. Also
we assume that the channel conditions between the jammer
4and the multiple receivers remain the same through two
consecutive time slots.
IV. JOINT DATA AND JAMMING SIGNAL ESTIMATION
For estimating the information and the jamming signal in
this paper we adopt the LMMSE [20], [23]. An LMMSE
estimator is an estimation method which minimizes the MSE
which is a common measure of estimator quality. The LMMSE
estimator ensures the minimum MSE from all linear estima-
tors. For our general linear model ~y = H~u+ ~w, the estimator
of ~u is given as:
~ˆu = (HHC−1w H + C
−1
u )
−1HHC−1w ~y (8)
where C~w and C~u are the auto-covariance matrices of ~w and
~u respectively. The MSE of this estimator is the trace of C~e,
that is the covariance matrix or the estimation error:
MSE = Tr(C~e) = Tr((HHC−1w H + C
−1
u )
−1)) (9)
A. MSE derivation
As the literature has shown, a very challenging task is to
produce a closed-form expression for the desired estimator and
signal model [20], [26], [27]. In this subsection we outline the
process that has led to the desired expression that will help us
study the behavior of the proposed system.
Recall that in our model we assume that the noise is AWGN
with zero mean and variance σ2w and is uncorrelated across the
nodes. We have no information about the jamming signal and
so we assume that its mean is zero. Under these assumptions
and with the use of the general LMMSE estimator, the MSE
for the information u and jamming signal zi for nodes is given
in (10), and (11) respectively.
In order to understand better the implications of the pro-
duced expression we present results for the case of N = 4
where we have that
MSEu =
1
s− h22
σ4w2,2∗α −
h23
σ4w3,2∗β −
h24
σ4w4,2∗γ
(12)
Also MSEz2 is equal to
β ∗ γ ∗ s− h23
σ4w3,2
∗ γ − h24
σ4w4,2
∗ β
α ∗ β ∗ γ ∗ s− h22
σ4w2,2
∗ β ∗ γ − h23
σ4w3,2
∗ α ∗ γ − h24
σ4w4,2
∗ α ∗ β
(13)
where:
s =
h22
σ2w2,2
+
h23
σ2w3,2
+
h24
σ2w4,2
+
1
s2u
α =
1
σ2w2,1
+
1
σ2w2,2
+
1
σ2z2
β =
1
σ2w3,1
+
1
σ2w3,2
+
1
σ2z3
γ =
1
σ2w4,1
+
1
σ2w4,2
+
1
σ2z4
The first thing we notice from these expressions is that the
MSE of the information signal u is inversely proportional to
the number of nodes, that is we have benefits in the accuracy of
bit detection (MSE can be easily converted to Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) and Bit Error Rate (BER)) when more nodes
assist in the estimation process. Regarding the MSE of the esti-
mated jamming signal it is also increased with a higher number
of nodes but this is not obvious from the expression (11) that
is more involved. The precise quantification of these gains
is presented in the respective performance evaluation section
where we will delve into the performance of this estimator in
isolation first.
V. JAMMER SPEED ESTIMATION
Our ultimate goal is to estimate the jammer speed based on
jamming signal estimates that we obtained from the previous
section. Fig 1 indicates that between the jammer and each
receiver there is different AOD and a different distance (disti).
Using again the estimator in (8) we propose to combine the
values in the N ×1 estimated vector ~u (that contains the joint
data and the jamming signal) by diving them pairwise and
taking then the absolute value:
| uˆ1
uˆ2
| = | zˆ1
zˆ2
| = |hj,1z
hj,2z
| = |γ1poj,1e
j 2piλ fD,1τ1
γ2poj,2ej
2pi
λ fD,2τ2
|
...
| uˆN−2
uˆN−1
| = | zˆN−2
zˆN−1
| = |γN−2poj,N−2e
j 2piλ fD,N−2τN−2
γN−1poj,N−1ej
2pi
λ fD,N−1τN−1
|
Recall that the N − 1 receivers are assumed to be close
to each other, resulting in a constant value for the free
space propagation loss poj,i and the random variable γi for
the observation interval in the above equations. Under these
assumptions the previous set of equations is simplified to:
zˆ1
zˆ2
=
ej
2pi
λ ∆u1
fc
c cosφ1τ1
ej
2pi
λ ∆u2
fc
c cosφ2τ2
...
zˆN−2
zˆN−1
=
ej
2pi
λ ∆uN−2
fc
c cosφN−2τN−2
ej
2pi
λ ∆uN−1
fc
c cosφN−1τN−1
By taking the natural logarithm of the expressions on the left
and right we have:
ln (
zˆ1
zˆ2
) = ln (
eω|ur,1−uj | cosφ1τ1
eω|ur,2−uj | cosφ2τ2
)
...
ln (
zˆN−2
zˆN−1
) = ln (
eω|ur,N−2−uj | cosφN−2τN−2
eω|ur,N−1−uj | cosφN−1τN−1
)
where ur,i is the speed of every receiver, uj the speed of the
jammer in the area and the variables fcx = fcc , ω = j
2pi
λ fcx.
If we assume that the jammer approaches the i-th receiver at
a speed lower than its own speed the relative speed between
jammer and receiver is positive and so |ur,i−uj | = ur,i−uj .
By simplifying the previous logarithmic equations we have:
ln (
zˆ1
zˆ2
) = ω[(ur,1 − uj) cosφ1τ1 − (ur,2 − uj) cosφ2τ2]
...
ln (
zˆN−2
zˆN−1
) = ω[(ur,N−2 − uj) cosφN−2τN−2
− (ur,N−1 − uj) cosφN−1τN−1]
5MSEu =
1∑N
n=2(
h2n
σ2wn,2
) + 1s2u
−∑Nn=2( h2nσ4wn,2∗( 1σ2wn,1 + 1σ2wn,2 + 1σ2zn ) )
(10)
MSEzi =
∏N
n=2,n6=i(
1
σ2wn,1
+ 1
σ2wn,2
+ 1σ2zn
) ∗ (∑Nk=2( h2nσ2wn,2 ) + 1s2u )−∑Nk=2( h2nσ4wn,2 ) ∗∏Nn=2,n6=i,k( 1σ2wn,1 + 1σ2wn,2 + 1σ2zn )∏N
n=2(
1
σ2wn,1
+ 1
σ2wn,2
+ 1σ2zn
) ∗ (∑Nn=2( h2nσ2wn,2 ) + 1s2u )−∑Nk=2( h2nσ4wn,2 ) ∗∏Nn=2,n6=i( 1σ2wn,1 + 1σ2wn,2 + 1σ2zn )
(11)
In the above equations the estimated jamming signal values
on the left-hand side are complex numbers of the form:
aˆ1 + bˆ1j, ..., aˆN−2 + bˆN−2j. We observe that the real part of
the above equations on the right side is equal to zero. So all
the real parts, that is the aˆ’s, are equal to zero. We also assume
that the receivers move at similar speeds (ur,1 ' ur,2 '
... ' ur,N−1 = ur) as they are members of the platoon. By
replacing the AOD values with the order of equations (1) and
the time delays as τ1 = dist1c , τ2 =
dist2
c , ..., τN−1 =
distN−1
c
we have:
bˆ1 = ω[(ur − uj) xdist
dist1
∗ dist1
c
− (ur − uj)xdist + d
dist2
∗ dist2
c
]
...
bˆN−2 = ω[(ur − uj)xdist + (N − 3) ∗ d
distN−2
∗ distN−2
c
− (ur − uj)xdist + (N − 2) ∗ d
distN−1
∗ distN−1
c
]
Now, we can solve the above equations for the speed of the
jammer:
(1) : uˆj =
bˆ1 ∗ λ ∗ c2
d ∗ 2pi ∗ fc + ur
(2) : uˆj =
bˆ2 ∗ λ ∗ c2
d ∗ 2pi ∗ fc + ur
...
(N − 2) : uˆj = bˆN−2 ∗ λ ∗ c
2
d ∗ 2pi ∗ fc + ur
This means that we have N − 2 equations that involve the
speed of the jammer and the known value of d which is the
distance between the members of the platoon. We observe
that the only factor that differentiates these equations are
the (bˆ1, bˆ2, ..., bˆN−2) which are the imaginary parts of the
estimated complex numbers (ln ( zˆ1zˆ2 ), ln (
zˆ2
zˆ2
), ..., ln ( zˆN−2zˆN−1 )).
Consequently, these values are only related to the estimated
jamming signals zˆi. Obtaining the unbiased sample mean
estimator of the above point estimates for the speed of the
jammer we have:
ˆ¯uj =
N−2∑
l=1
1
N − 2(
bˆl ∗ λ ∗ c2
d ∗ 2pi ∗ fc + ur) (14)
Hence, if we increase the number of receivers we obtain a
better estimate of the speed of the jammer. Now in the case
that the jammer approaches the i-th receiver at a speed lower
than the relative speed between the jammer and the receiver, it
has positive sign if |ur − uj | = uj − ur. Repeating the above
procedure results in something analogous to (14), namely:
ˆ¯uj =
N−2∑
l=1
1
N − 2(ur −
bˆl ∗ λ ∗ c2
d ∗ 2pi ∗ fc ) (15)
We must note that we do not need to know a-priori the
correct sign of the relationship |ur − uj | since one of the
two (14), (15) will have a negative sign and consequently this
estimated jammer speed value must be rejected. In this case,
the alternative equation must be used to estimate the speed of
the jammer.
VI. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS FOR AWGN
AND RAYLEIGH CHANNELS
For our simulations we assume that the master node together
with the other nodes form a platoon of vehicles that move
together in a specific direction with approximately a constant
velocity. The jammer is in a specific distance and moves in
parallel with them but we do not have any information for its
position and channel condition between itself and the nodes
in the platoon. We gradually present results for the AWGN
channel, a Rayleigh fading channel, and finally a realistic
vehicular channel that includes LOS and shadowing from
obstacles in the next section. In this way we can offer a full
exploration of all the aspects of our system.
For the AWGN and Rayleigh channels our purpose is to
evaluate the ability of the estimator in (10) and (11) to
accurately estimate the jamming signal. Consequently, we also
test a baseline system where the master node transmits data
continuously without stopping its transmission as with the
proposed scheme. In our analytical model this result can be
obtained by setting the noise variance to infinity in (2). Fur-
thermore, we assume σ2w to be equal to 0.1. The information
signal u is a random binary sequence with power equal to
σ2u = 1 leading thus to a transmit SNR of 10dB. Higher
SNRs would lead to higher gains. For the jamming signal
note that its variance σ2zi at every node takes different values
because of channel fading. We implemented our algorithm in
Matlab and we executed 50000 iterations for every different
system configuration. For our results we present the MSE for
the transmitted information u and for the jamming signal zi.
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Fig. 2. Results for the AWGN channel.
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Fig. 3. Results for the Rayleigh fading channel.
A. Results for an AWGN channel
In Fig. 2 we present the results for the MSEu and MSEzi
for the proposed and baseline systems. We observe that in the
baseline system the MSEu and the MSEzi for N = 2 nodes
start at the same value. This is what we expect to observe
because only (3) is available for u and zi (and hi=1). As
we add nodes the two MSE’s improve and the MSE of the
information u enjoys higher improvements with every new
node. For the proposed system our results are much better
as we have also the observations from the first time slot
for every node and we can estimate and isolate better the
jamming signal that eventually results in a better estimation
of the information u. Although we have better MSE’s for both
estimated parameters we observe a behavior that requires some
further explanation. As we observe in Fig. 2 for the proposed
system for a number nodes N = 2, 3, the MSEzi is better
than the MSEu. This indicates that one can estimate better
the different jamming signals for every node than the common
information u for all nodes but this is not the case. The reason
s2z
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Fig. 4. Power of the jamming signal increases in the proposed system for
N=5.
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Fig. 5. Power of the jamming signal increases in both systems for N=5.
for this behavior is that the information signal that we are
trying to estimate is common for all nodes but the jamming
signal zi is different for every node and contains the unknown
channel hji and the real jamming term z. So it is easier for
us to estimate a range of values zi than a discrete value u.
B. Results for Rayleigh fading channel
When the channels between the master node and the other
nodes are Rayleigh fading hi takes random values. We adopt
the same assumptions for the variance of the information
signal and the noise. In Fig. 3 we present the results for MSEu
and MSEzi. We observe that in the baseline system the MSE
is greater than the proposed system because in the baseline
system we have only the observations of the second time slot
for every node so we do not have the ability to estimate the
jamming signal. In both systems the MSEu that is achieved
for N ≥ 4 is adequate for a communication system. The final
thing that we observe is that for a small number of nodes
the estimation of the jamming signal seems to be better than
7that of the information. The information signal u that we want
to estimate is common for all nodes but the jamming signal
is just a different term zi which contains also the unknown
channel hj,i for every node. That means that with the same two
observations for every node we are estimating from a set of
two possible discrete BPSK values for u (effectively detecting
the signal), and simultaneously we estimate zi = hj,iz (and
not z which might also be a discrete modulated signal). The
MSEzi has low values even for small N . As the number of
nodes increases the observations from the different nodes for
the information signal u increase leading to a MSEu that is
lower than MSEzi. This is achieved for N ≥ 6.
C. Results for MSE vs σ2z
In our next set of results we assume a constant number of
nodes N = 5 and we vary σ2z between 1 to 10. In Fig. 4
we observe that in the proposed system that we have two
observations for every node, as σ2z increases, both MSEu,
MSEzi remain practically in the same low desirable value
below 0.1. That means that our system is not vulnerable to
jamming, and as the power of the jamming signal σ2z increases
the system responds and estimates the information signal u in a
very efficient way. In Fig. 5 we observe the difference between
the baseline and the proposed system. Here as σ2z increases
(power of jamming increases) we observe a massive increase
in MSEu and MSEzi. These results illustrate the importance
of the observations in (2) for every node. In the baseline
system that we practically cannot use these observations we
have only (3) for every node. That means that we have no
more information for every zi and when this jamming signal
has higher power than the information signal we cannot isolate
and estimate the later.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR VEHICULAR CHANNEL
In this section we seek to evaluate the performance of
the speed estimation algorithm in conjunction with the jam-
ming signal estimation algorithm. For this purpose, we used
the Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) tool and OM-
NET++/VEINS [28]. SUMO is adopted as our traffic sim-
ulator and OMNET++ is used to simulate wireless commu-
nication. Furthermore, the GEMV (a geometry-based efficient
propagation model for V2V) [29] tool was integrated into the
VEINS network simulator for a more realistic simulation of
the PHY layer [6]. For describing the modeled area GEMV
uses the outlines of vehicles, buildings and foliage. Based on
the outlines of the objects, it forms R-trees. R-tree is a tree
data structure in which objects in the field are bound by rectan-
gles and are hierarchically structured based on their location
in space. Hence, GEMV employs a simple geometry-based
small-scale signal variation model and calculates the additional
stochastic signal variation and the number of diffracted and
reflected rays based on the information about the surrounding
objects.
A. Cooperative Jammer Speed Estimation Results
We present our results in terms of the Mean Absolute
Error (MAE) between the real value of the speed uj and the
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the proposed and the baseline method for the
MAE of the jammer speed estimation using a different number of receivers.
estimated mean of the jammer speed in (14), (15) using the
estimated results from multiple receivers uˆj :
MAE = |ˆ¯uj − uj | (16)
The MAE is calculated for both baseline and the proposed
two-stage transmission scheme. These estimated MAE values
are presented in Fig. 6 for both baseline and the proposed
two-stage transmission scheme with a different number of
receivers in the interval [0,50]. In this experiment we also
assume that the jammer approaches the platoon of vehicles
with a maximum speed of 28 km/h and the receivers move
with random speeds that belong in the interval [30,38] km/h.
By setting the number of receivers to N = 50 nodes, we
observed that the jammer can effectively communicate with
only 25 out of 50 nodes based on the GEMV simulator [29].
Because of its superior performance we use the proposed two-
stage transmission scheme for the rest of the experiments.
It can be seen in Fig. 7 that after a number of 25 receivers
the MAE of the estimated jammer speed converges to a stable
value for both systems under comparison. This is because
beyond 25, there are no other effective communication pairs
between the jammer and the receivers.
But in reality, the members of a platoon of vehicles never
moves at exactly the same speed. So, when we change slightly
the range where the speed of the receivers can vary, we
observe in Fig. 7 that as this range is narrower, the MAE
decreases. This is because in this case the speed deviation
of all the receivers will be present as an additional condition
in (14), (15). This result is very encouraging since it states that
when it is used in vehicle formations that all have the same
approximate speed (e.g. platoons), the speed of the jammer
can be estimated with improved accuracy.
For our next experiment we check the robustness of the
proposed distributed system with 20 multiple receivers but
over time. We update the jamming signal zi estimate using (8)
every ∆t = 20 sec., while in the intermediate time instants we
use the last estimated jamming signal as our current estimate
of the jammer speed. The jammer speed estimate that takes
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20 sec. for jamming signal estimation.
place in the time interval [1, 100] sec. is presented in Fig. 8.
During [1, 75] sec. the jammer moves with a speed of 25 km/h,
while from time 75 sec. onwards a sharp increase in the speed
of the jammer to 50 km/h is observed. Therefore, for the
specific time interval [75, 90] sec. the MAE value increases
significantly. This is happening because of the jammer speed
in the subsequent time instants between 75 and 90 sec. is
actually the old estimate made at 70 seconds. This is clearly
an approach that may create a stale value for the estimated
speed when we have changes.
To solve the previous problem we apply a smoothing filter
for combining the jammer speed estimates across time. In
particular we combine the last estimate with the estimated
jammer speed at the present time instant ˆ¯uj(t) as follows:
ˆ¯uj(filtered)(t) = (1− a)ˆ¯uj(t) + a ∗ ˆ¯uj(filtered)(t− 1) (17)
We explored for two extreme values a = [0.8, 0.2] and the
results can be seen in Fig. 9. Observing these results, it is
obvious that giving parameter a large values such as 0.8,
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Fig. 9. Jammer speed estimation for a period of 100 sec. using different
values for parameter a.
results in a sharp changes in filtered speed estimate over the
entire duration of this specific experiment and especially in the
specific time interval [75,90] sec. This is because the speed
of the jammer is mainly estimated using the last estimate of
its speed. This results in the smoothing filter being unable to
estimate the actual instantaneous changes in the speed of the
jammer. On the contrary, by giving lower values to parameter
a around 0.3 or 0.2, all abrupt changes are absorbed by the
smoothing filter and so the MAE does not vary significantly
over time.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a network when a swarm
of nodes that receive an information signal from a master
node and a signal from an RF jammer. We proposed first a
transmission scheme where the master node remains silent for
a slot, and second a joint data and jamming signal estimation
algorithm using LMMSE estimation. We derived analytical
closed-form expressions for the MSE of our system. Our
results indicate that as the number of nodes in the swarm
increases, the estimation of both the jamming and information
signals is improved significantly. Our results also showed that
our proposed transmission scheme is robust against RF jam-
ming attacks since, although the power of the jamming signal
(σ2z ) increases, the MSEu and MSEzi remains constant.
Finally, we proposed a method for combining the jamming
signal estimates from the multiple receivers so as to improve
the accuracy of the jammer speed estimate. To the best of
our knowledge, our proposed scheme is the first distributed
estimation scheme for the speed of an RF jammer. The
experimental results prove that the speed estimate of the
jammer is improved by increasing the number of receivers
and the proposed method is particularly suitable for a platoon
of vehicles since they use approximately the same speed.
REFERENCES
[1] O. Pun˜al, I. Aktas¸, C.-J. Schnelke, G. Abidin, K. Wehrle, and J. Gross,
“Machine learning-based jamming detection for IEEE 802.11: Design
9and experimental evaluation,” in 2014 IEEE 15th International Sym-
posium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
(WoWMoM), 2014, pp. 1–10.
[2] S. Malebary, W. Xu, and C.-T. Huang, “Jamming mobility in 802.11
p networks: Modeling, evaluation, and detection,” in 2016 IEEE 35th
International on Performance Computing and Communications Confer-
ence (IPCCC), 2016, pp. 1–7.
[3] D. Kosmanos, A. Pappas, L. M. Francisco J. Aparicio Navarro, H. Jan-
icke, E. Boiten, and A. Argyriou, “Intrusion detection system for pla-
tooning connected autonomous vehicles,” SEEDA-CECNSM conference,
2019.
[4] D. Kosmanos, A. Pappas, L. Maglaras, S. Moschoyiannis, F. J.Aparicio-
Navarro, A. Argyriou, and H. Janicke, “A novel intrusion detection
system against spoofing attacks in connected electric vehicles,” in Array.
Elsevier, December 2019.
[5] D. Kosmanos, L. Maglaras, M. Mavrovouniotis, S. Moschoyiannis,
A. Argyriou, A. Maglaras, and H. Janicke, “Route optimization of
electric vehicles based on dynamic wireless charging,” in IEEE Access,
vol. 6, 2018, pp. 42 551 – 42 565.
[6] D. Kosmanos, N. Prodromou, A. Argyriou, L. A. Maglaras, and H. Jan-
icke, “MIMO techniques for jamming threat suppression in vehicular
networks,” Mobile Information Systems, pp. 1–9, 2016.
[7] D. Karagiannis and A. Argyriou, “Jamming attack detection in a pair
of RF communicating vehicles using unsupervised machine learning,”
Vehicular Communications, vol. 13, pp. 56–63, July 2018.
[8] A. Sheikholeslami, M. Ghaderi, H. Pishro-Nik, and D. Goeckel,
“Jamming-aware minimum energy routing in wireless networks,” IEEE
Access, vol. 6, November 2018.
[9] B. Duan, D. Yin, Y. Cong, H. Zhou, X. Xiang, and L. Shen, “Anti-
jamming path planning for unmanned aerial vehicles with imperfect
jammer information,” 2018 IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Biomimetics (ROBIO), Dec. 2018.
[10] A. Alipour-Fanid, M. Dabaghchian, H. Zhang, and K. Zeng, “String
stability analysis of cooperative adaptive cruise control under jamming
attacks,” 2017 IEEE 18th International Symposium on High Assurance
Systems Engineering (HASE), Jan. 2017.
[11] D. Kosmanos, A. Argyriou, and L. Maglaras, “Estimating the Relative
Speed of RF Jammers in VANETs,” Security and Communication
Networks, vol. 2019, November 2019.
[12] Y. R. Zheng and C. Xiao, “Mobile speed estimation for broadband wire-
less communications over rician fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications, vol. 8, pp. 1–8, 2009.
[13] N. Kassem, A. E. Kosba, and M. Youssef, “RF-based vehicle detection
and speed estimation,” Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring),
2012 IEEE 75th, 2012.
[14] J. Wang, J. Tong, Q. Gao, Z. Wu, S. Bi, and H. Wang, “Device-free
vehicle speed estimation with wifi,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. 67, pp. 8205 – 8214, 2018.
[15] M. Pirani, E. Hashemi, A. Khajepour, B. Fidan, B. Litkouhi, and S.-K.
Chen, “Cooperative vehicle speed fault diagnosis and correction,” IEEE
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 20, pp. 783 –
789, 2018.
[16] Z. A. Biron and P. Pisu, “Distributed fault detection and estimation for
cooperative adaptive cruise control system in a platoon,” in PHM 2015
Conference, 2015.
[17] H. Akhlaghpasand, S. M. Razavizadeh, E. Bjrnson, and T. T. Do,
“Jamming detection in massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Wireless Com-
munications Letters, vol. 7, pp. 242 – 245, 2018.
[18] Q. He, R. S. Blum, and A. M. Haimovich, “Noncoherent MIMO
radar for location and velocity estimation: More antennas means better
performance,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 58, pp.
3661 – 3680, 2010.
[19] S. Xu, W. Xu, C. Pan, and M. Elkashlan, “Detection of jamming
attack in non-coherent massive SIMO systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 14, pp. 2387 – 2399, 2019.
[20] A. Argyriou and O. Alay, “Distributed estimation in wireless sensor net-
works with an interference canceling fusion center,” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 2205–2214, 2016.
[21] S. Farahmand, A. Cano, and G. B. Giannakis, “Anti-jam distributed
MIMO decoding using wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Signal Processing, vol. 58, pp. 3661 – 3680, 2010.
[22] S. Santini, A. Salvi, A. S. Valente, A. Pescap, M. Segata, and R. L.
Cigno, “Platooning Maneuvers in Vehicular Networks: A Distributed and
Consensus-Based Approach,” EEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 59–72, March 2019.
[23] M. J. Neely, Stochastic Network Optimization with Application to
Communication and Queueing Systems. Morgan & Claypool, 2010.
[24] M. Spuhler, V. Lenders, and M. Wilhelm, “Detection of reactive jam-
ming in DSSS-based wireless communications,” IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications, vol. 13, pp. 165 – 171, 2014.
[25] O. Punal, C. Pereira, A. Aguiar, and J. Gross, “Experimental charac-
terization and modeling of RF jamming attacks on VANETs,” in IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 64, 2015, pp. 524–540.
[26] J. C. Mukherjee and A. Gupta, “A review of charge scheduling of electric
vehicles in smart grid,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 1541–
1553, Dec 2015.
[27] I. Bahceci and A. Khandani, “Linear estimation of correlated data in
wireless sensor networks with optimum power allocation and analog
modulation,” Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56, no. 7,
pp. 1146–1156, 2008.
[28] C. Sommer, R. German, and F. Dressler, “Bidirectionally coupled
network and road traffic simulation for improved IVC analysis,” in IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 10 (1), 2015, pp. 3–15.
[29] M. Boban, J. Barros, and O. K. Tonguz, “Geometry-based Vehicle-to-
Vehicle channel modeling for large-scale simulation,” IEEE Transactions
on Vehicular Technology, vol. 63, pp. 4146 – 4164, 2016.
